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1. Introduction
The author is not a historian of science and technology but a student mainly 
observing socio-economic aspects of technology transfer in the less developed 
countries today. However, as we shall see soon, the present situation of the less 
developed world has its origin in the period with which this conference is mainly 
concerned. In this context a student of contemporary technological problems may 
have something relevant to say about this period. The theme of this conference 
reminds me of a paragraph of Professor Celso Furtade, the influential Latin 
American economist. 
     The advent of an industrial nucleus in eighteenth century Europe 
     disrupted the world economy of the time and eventually 
     conditioned later economic development in almost every region in 
     the world. The action of that powerful dynamic nucleus proceeded 
     to operate in three directions.1 
     This sentence most adequately characterizes the period which we are going 
to discuss in this conference: namely 1780 to 1880. It was an age in which a 
powerful industrial nucleus emerged in Britain right at the beginning, enlarging 
its frontiers around the globe, and eventually covering the entire surface of the 
earth near the end. The transfer of science and technology of this period was 
certainly related to the action of this powerful nucleus. 
     Professor Furtade stresses that this action proceeded to operate in three 
directions: the first was towards the European economy itself where the 
disorganization of the pre-capitalistic artisan economy and organization of the 
capitalistic economy proceeded in parallel. The second was towards sparsely
1 Furtade, Celso Development and Underdevelopment (California 1964) 127.
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populated regions such as North America, Australia, etc., where "the 
development was not basically different from the process of development of 
Europe itself, of which it formed a part". In both directions we can observe many 
examples of transfers of science and technology. It will be the third direction, 
however, in which the members of this conference are mostly interested because 
Japan and Asian countries are to be found in this direction. 
     The third line of expansion of the European industrial economy was 
     towards already inhabited regions, some of which were densely 
     populated, whose old economic systems were of various, but 
     invariably pre-capitalistic, types. The contacts between the vigorous 
     capitalistic economies and these regions of long-standing habitation 
      did not occur in a uniform manner....The result, however, was 
     almost always to create hybrid structures, part tending to behave as 
     a capitalistic system, part perpetuating the feature of the previously 
     existing system. The phenomenon of underdevelopment today is 
     precisely a matter of this type of dualistic economy. 
Here Professor Furtade is referring to the origin of the underdeveloped world 
today. Though his concern is mainly Latin America, members of this conference 
should feel that his words are equally valid to Asian countries of the period of our 
concern. Surely the phenomenon of underdevelopment in Asia today has its 
origin in its encounter with the frontier of the European industrial economy in this 
period. However, there remains something worrying about this last sentence. 
That is the case of Japan. 
     Japan was densely populated when it came in contact with the European 
industrial economy. Its socio-economic system was of a pre-capitalistic type: 
feudalism which was described in a contemporary French journal as follows "on 
trouvrait reproduire la constitution du royaume de France sous les premiers 
Capetiens".2 It developed a dualistic economy under the impact from the West in 
which the traditional and modern (or Westernized) sectors developed in parallel. 
Technology supporting this development was distinct in its hybrid nature. All 
these are exactly in accordance with Professor Furtade's description of his 
"dualistic economy". Nevertheless, with regard to Japan, this dualistic economy 
was not a cause of underdevelopment today but a starting point of its 
industrialization and economic growth. Why was it possible? Why and where 
did the difference between Japan and other less developed countries come from? 
These are the main concerns of this paper. 
     These questions came to the author when he gave Mexican students a series 
of lectures on the rise of modern technology in Japan, in 1983. At that time, the
2 Duchesne de Bellecourt
, C. 'La Chine et le Japon a 1'Exposition Universelle', in Reveue de Deux 
  Mondes (1 aout 1867) 722.
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author acquired for the first time a view point which saw Japanese development 
as being unlike others in different parts of the world in the nineteenth century, 
developing through dynamic interaction between a regional traditional economy 
and the action of the European industrial nucleus and found that Japan's 
development was extremely peculiar. Since that time these questions have been 
ones of concern to the author. 
     However, in order to define the problem in a clearer form, it will be 
necessary to confirm in more detail the peculiar points of Japan's reaction against 
the frontier of European industrial economy in comparison to other Asian or Latin 
American countries. Let us start with describing briefly how Japan reacted against 
it, focusing on its technological activities.
2. Technology Transfer To Japan 1840 to 1890
After the Opium War 
     The first reaction was the movement of rich and strong 'han' towards an 
expansion in Western style armaments. The Saga Han started this soon after 
hearing the news that China had been defeated in the Opium War, and Satsuma 
followed immediately thereafter. Many han joined them after facing the menace 
of Kurofune (Western 'Black Ships'). The target of the movement was to acquire 
"Guns and Sails" (preferably steam ships) for the fight against Western fleets. 
"Between 1850 and 1868 there had been at least 11 (eleven!!) sites, where the 
construction of reverberatory furnace actually started; three further sites have only 
reached the planning stage, another plan is-due to the lack of written sources-
doubtful" writes Dr. Pauer with regard to cannon casting.3 As for shipbuilding 
there had been sixteen plans for the construction of shipyards including the two 
by the Bakufu (government). 
     The extraordinary feature of all attempts, before 1857, was the fact that all 
the work involved was carried out in strict accordance with directions found in a 
few Dutch books, though the construction of the Bakufu's shipyard in Nagasaki, 
which started in this year, was carried out under the guidance of a Dutch 
engineer. It was indeed a movement of technology transfer from Holland to 
Japan; carried out, however, with only the help of books and little direct guidance 
from Dutch engineers. It is not surprising that such endeavors should have 
resulted in many failures. Consequently the movement began to decline as early
3 Pauer, Erich Japan's Industrial Apprenticeship: A Case Study on the Initiative Role of the 
   Reverberatory Furnace for the Japanese Industrial Revolution', paper presented to the 
   Japanologist Conference on Technology Transfer, Transformation and Development: The 
  Japanese Experience (Tokyo April 20-23,1981) 4.
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as around 1855. It may be termed a miracle, however, that over 200 iron cannons 
and a small steam boat could be successfully constructed through this movement. 
     A Dutch naval officer observed this Japanese version of the steamboat in 
March of 1858. A steam engine made with brass was settled in a small traditional 
Japanese flat bottom ship. The ship was propelled by paddle wheels powered by 
this engine. Because of bad machine work, steam was leaking from many parts of 
the engine. He estimated that its actual power would be barely two or three horse 
power while the size of cylinder suggested that the designed power was about 
twelve. "However, who among us can construct a steam engine without any 
experience of seeing the real steam engine, only with the aid of a very simple 
drawing? Considering this I couldn't help admiring the extraordinary talent of 
the men who made this engine," he wrote .4 His words suffice to express the 
extraordinary nature of this movement. 
     This action was based on the long tradition of Rangaku (Dutch learning) 
During the Edo period when Japan was isolated from the world, the Japanese 
studied Western science through Dutch books and made various scientific 
apparatus. For example, the Wimshurst influence machine, microscopes, the 
telegraph, etc., were made mainly according to descriptions available in those 
books. When they faced the urgent need for cannons and steamboats for the battle 
against the West, all they could do was to follow this traditional procedure of 
Rangaku: that is, at first to acquire a textbook through the Dutch trading house in 
Nagasaki; then to carry out a collaborated translation of it into Japanese; and 
finally to construct the object through trial and error according to the description 
found in the books. For cannon casting, Ulrich Huguenin's Het Gietvezen in s'Rijks 
Ijzer-Geschutgieterij, to Luik (1826) was used and for steamboat building, G. J. 
Verdam's Volledige Verhandeling over de Stoomwerktuigen (1832) was the text. The 
fact that three different translations prevailed for the former testified to the large 
scale of the movement. 
     Japanese historians have long disputed the importance of this movement to 
later development. Some estimate it highly as a precursor of later military-biased 
heavy industry while others emphasize its feudal nature and consequently see a 
break between it and later capitalistic development. The author's view is to place 
importance on the epistemological process accompanying to this movement. 
Firstly through this movement many samurai recognized the difference between 
the manufacture of a copied instrument and that of laboratory work but to make 
the latter was an industrial activity. For instance samurai of the Satsuma Han
4 Kattendyke, W. D. Llittreksel uit het dagboek van W.J.C. Ridder H. v. Kattendyke gedurende zijn 
  verblijf in Japan in 1857, 1858 en 1859 ('sGravenhage 1860). This citation is from the Japanese 
  translation of this book Nagasaki Kaigun Densyilsho no Hibi (Tokyo 1964) 96.
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knew nothing about machining an engine block. Their brass engine was finished 
exclusively by file and chisel. Afterwards they saw the engine room of a Dutch 
warship of which the engine power was 400h.p. and recognized the huge gap 
between an industrially produced marine engine and their hand made brass 
engine. They returned to Satsuma and reported that it seemed to be impossible to 
manufacture a workable steam engine without machine tools.5 In this way they 
gradually became aware of what sort of activities existed behind the amazing 
armaments of Western fleets. 
     Secondly the movement consumed enormous financial resources. The 
Satsuma Han gave up its plan for building fifteen warships as early as in 1855. 
The main reason was exhaustion of the treasury. Many han faced the same 
problem. This experience attracted their attention to another factor behind the 
armament of Western fleets: that is, the wealth of the nation. Some samurai of 
Satsuma began to talk about the relation between the wealth and the strength of a 
nation by the early 1860'5.6 
     It was the recognition of these two facts which propelled many samurai to 
go to Europe in the 1860's and to confirm with their own eyes the actual socio-
economic conditions there. And they saw that the wealth of Western nations was 
being produced by an industrialized economy. 
     One important difference between Japan of the time and less developed 
countries today seems, to the author, to be that Japan had a relatively larger 
number of leaders who knew through their experience what was industry. 
Between 1862 and 1868 a minimum of two hundred samurai visited Europe or the 
U.S.A. and studied or observed industrial activities there.7 Many industrial leaders 
of the early Meiji period were included among them, for instance, Shibusawa 
Eiichi, Godai Tomoatsu, Ito Hirobumi, Yamao Yozo, Ito Masaru, and Enomoto 
Takeaki, among others.
After the Opening of the Ports 
     The second reaction, in 1859, which started with the opening of the ports 
was necessarily economic while the first was military or techno-political. Exports
5 Shidan Sokkiroku No. 40. 
6 For instance, a letter to Shimazu Tadayoshi (the lord of Satsuma) from Godai Tomoatsu in 
   1864. Editing Board of the Shimazu Family, ed. Satsuhan Kaigun-shi (A History of the Satsuma 
  Navy) 2 (1928) 867-90. 
7 The late Professor Yoshida wrote "their number is estimated to have reached 500" inYoshida 
  Mitsukuni Nippon to Chi2goku [Japan and China] (Tokyo 1989) 23. Perhaps this can be 
   considered the maximum estimate. We adopt here, as a minimum estimate, the number in a 
   list compiled by Professor Ishizuki in the appendix of Ishizuki Minoru Kindai Nippon no Kaigai 
  Ryt2gaku-shi [A History of Japanese Students Studying Abroad] (Tokyo, 1992).
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of silk and tea grew rapidly. Western merchants urgently demanded these 
because of the silk worm epidemic in Europe and the civil war in China which 
had previously been supplying them to Europe. The share of silk surpassed 50% 
of Japan's total exports until the Meiji Restoration. The increasing exports were 
accompanied by an increase in imports. Cotton and wool textiles, and refined 
sugar were major items. 
     This is a very common pattern. For instance, Professor Furtade writes of 
the Latin American experience where the impact of European industrial economy 
first caused a rapid development of export-oriented primary industries, closely 
connected with demand from the Western industrial nucleus; and then a 
correspondingly large increase in imports of manufactured consumer goods from 
the West.8 His words are quite applicable to Japan, though in the later 
development of Japan and Latin America a remarkable difference grew as we 
shall see later. 
     The rapidly increasing silk export was accompanied by another important 
event which affected later development. That was a serious shortage of silk yarn 
and consequently a large increase in its price in the domestic market. The local 
silk textile industry was greatly damaged, although some weavers did begin 
experimenting with the use of imported thin cotton yarn as a substitute for silk at 
this time. In addition, the American Civil War broke out in 1860. A resultant 
world shortage of raw cotton stimulated exports from Japan, and caused a 
shortage of cotton yarn in the local market. This damaged the local cotton textile 
industry and at the same time produced the experience of using imported cotton 
yarn to cotton weavers. Technologically the experience of these weavers had large 
implications for later development as we shall see in the next section. 
     Although the period between the opening of the ports and the Meiji 
Restoration was a mere eight years, a rough scheme for later economic 
development was determined during this time. After the Restoration, however, 
the new government took its industrial policy in a different direction. That is, 
towards the way represented by the Kdbush6-jigy6 (government enterprises). It 
established the K6bush6 (Ministry of Public Works) in 1870 and began 
establishing many government enterprises with the help of technology transfer 
from the West. The work included the construction of railways, the telegraph 
network, light houses, two shipyards, several manufacturing plants for iron, 
machinery, and glass, the exploitation of ten mines (gold, silver, iron, coal, and oil) 
and the establishment of a technical college. Other governmental departments
8 Furtade, Celso Op. cit., 134-5.
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such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Army and the 
Navy also managed manufacturing plants. 
     These government enterprises have been highly estimated as a model of 
technology transfer in late comer countries by some historians.9 The main line of 
this argument was that the Meiji government took leadership in establishing many 
plants by intensive technology imports from the West, and after having 
assimilated imported technology, sold these plants to private entrepreneurs 
cheaply, successfully establishing the core of the private modern (i.e., 
Westernized) sector in a capital scarce country with no technological background. 
     However, the author is suspicious of this argument. Let us imagine that 
such large scale and comprehensive public works were to be carried out in a less 
developed country today. It is clear that this would result in a large financial 
deficit as well as current account imbalances, and consequently serious inflation. 
Did the Meiji government have anything like a magic wand to escape from such a 
situation? Not at all. It suffered just such a large deficit in finance and current 
balance, and resultant inflation. 
     The situation was far worse for the Meiji government. With the abolition of 
the feudal system most samurai lost their livelihood. A great amount of money 
was needed to pension them off and for war expenditure against their rebellions 
while the real income from land taxes, which was the government's main financial 
resource, was decreasing annually through inflation. 
     As early as 1877, leaders were beginning to discuss the abolition of 
Kobush8. In December of this year Okubo Toshimichi wrote Gyoseikaikaku 
Kengensho (A Proposal for the Reform of Public Administration). He stressed that 
if they continued with the present administration policies for some years there 
surely would remain evils accumulated during these years, and therefore that 
they should proceed to the next step after having eliminated the already 
accumulating evils of these past years. 
     Now nearly ten years has passed since the Restoration. It is the time 
      to eliminate the evil of ten years and reform our system. ... However, 
     what was the evil of ten years? It is the lack of financial resources. 
     This is the final cause of every disease. At the Restoration, we 
     thought that the help of foreign advisors was inevitable for 
     achieving our urgent tasks and hired them. Laws, educational 
      systems, army and navy, agriculture, manufacture, reclamation, and 
     other plans, there were no new enterprises established without the 
     advice of foreigners. 
         However, there was of course no reason why these foreigners 
     have to be deeply concerned about our poor financial situation.
9 For instance, see Smith, Thomas C. Political Change and Industrial 
   Government Enterprise, 1868-1880 (Stanford 1955).
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     Their only concern is to show their talent in magnificent works, most 
     of which were arbitrarily borrowed from models in the advanced 
     and civilized countries. We could say that their works were but a 
     mere transplantation of superficial features of Europe. 
       Reflecting deliberately on the appropriateness of their works to 
     actual conditions of Japan, we cannot help concluding that they are a 
     sort of vanity far inappropriate to our present situation; too many 
     undertakings for poor financial resources.10 
     This can be seen as an honest confession of their estimate of KBbushd-jigy6. 
Okubo's proposals were; dismissal of all foreign advisors, a merger of Kabusha 
and Naimush6 (Ministry of Home Affairs), a radical rationalization of government 
organization and a large personnel cut. 
     While Okubo's tragic assassination deprived him of an opportunity to carry 
out this policy himself, the government took the course he directed. It dismissed 
foreign advisors successively. In 1880 the sale of government enterprises except 
arsenals was decided and the KBbushO was abolished in 1885. If we admire the 
leadership of the Meiji government, we should certainly appreciate the actions 
shown by them in this drastic revision of policy.
After the Revision of Policy 
     The revised policies featured three principles: first, less and less 
expenditure, second, no foreign participation, and third, trade balance recovery. 
This last was succeeded from the policy of the first decade. The trend in the 
balance of trade was very simple. It was black before the Restoration and red after 
it. The accumulated deficit was reaching a dangerous limit towards the end of the 
1870's. The main causes of this trend were the stagnation of silk export on the one 
hand, and a large increase in selected imports, especially cotton yarn, on the other. 
     The government appointed Matsukata Masayoshi to be Minister of Finance 
in 1880. He adopted a strict retrenchment policy and at the same time made every 
effort to decrease imports and to increase exports. Japanese historians are still in 
dispute about the merits and demerits of his policy. It caused a serious deflation 
lasting until 1885 and occasioned great damage to local industries. On the other 
hand, efforts for the promotion of exports oriented, necessarily, the attention of 
administrators towards the traditional sector, for exportable products did not exist 
in the Westernized (modern) sector except for a small amount of coal. Silk yarn, 
silk worm eggs, tea, textiles, lacquer ware, ceramics, straw mats, braided cords, 
dried sea foods, etc., everything which had a possibility of export became a target 
for promotion. Because of the principle of less expenditure, the government
10 Okubo Toshimichi Monjo [Documents of Okubo Toshimichi] 7:445-9.
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necessarily relied on cheap information services excluding expensive technology 
imports as far as it possibly could. It energetically organized meetings for the 
exchange of technical know-how, expositions of local commodities, seminars on 
new techniques, etc. 
     It was not that plant imports were excluded completely. Another target of 
the policy was the import-substitution of cotton yarn. The main lines of the policy 
were as follows. The government imported equipment for ten cotton spinning 
mills of equal size (2000 mule spindles per mill). They were sold to competent 
entrepreneurs, in cotton-cultivating regions, who paid for them over a period of 
ten years with no interest. In addition, various measures were designed for 
financially supporting entrepreneurs who were willing to enter the spinning 
industry. Though this policy put more importance on private entrepreneurs' 
initiative than that of the first decade, it nevertheless failed utterly. All 
transplanted mills suffered from lack of maintenance as well as management 
skills, low operation rates, high capital output ratio, low product quality and 
consequently horrid business performance. All these are common in technology 
transfers to less developed countries today.11 
     Thus new policies also involved many failures. Nevertheless, roughly 
speaking, the principle of less expenditure hampered the government from 
intervening too excessively in private sector activities and as a result liberated the 
latent energy of private capital. A good example was the construction of railways. 
     The government monopolized both railway construction and management 
in the first decade. Private entrepreneurs were allowed to enter the railway 
business in the second decade. Though construction was carried out by the 
government, many lines were delivered to private companies after their 
completion. This policy enabled government to cover its lack of finance with 
private capital and accelerated the construction of railways. In 1880 the total 
kilometrage of Japan's railways was a mere 123km. After the first entry of private 
capital in 1883, total kilometrage surpassed 2,000km by 1890 and reached 6,480km 
in 1900.12 The introduction of private capital was truly successful. Progress in 
railway construction connected local industries to large city markets and 
exporting ports, thus triggering their development. Together with the growth of 
local economies more and more private capital was invested in local railway lines. 
This process played an important role in economic growth after the deflation.
11 Nakaoka, Tetsuro 'The Transfer of Cotton Manufacturing Technology from Britain to Japan', in 
   Jeremy, David J. ed. International Technology Transfer: Europe, Japan and the USA, 1700-1914 
  (1991)181-98. 
12 Tetsudoin, ed. Honp6 Tetsud6 no Shakai oyobi Keizai ni oyoboseru Eiky6 [Effects of Railways on the 
  Economy and Society of Japan] 1 (1915) 62.
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     The principle of self help did not mean that Japan abandoned efforts to 
acquire technology from the West. It only meant the replacement of expensive 
plant imports with cheap and practical instrument imports, and expensive foreign 
technical advisers with cheaper Japanese ones. Japan continued to send students 
to the West after the Restoration. They included two important groups: one was 
skilled craftsmen dispatched by local governments, the other was graduate 
students from higher educational institutions for science and engineering 
established after the Restoration-namely Kobu Daigakk8 (The Imperial Technical 
College) and the Faculty of Natural Science, Tokyo University. The former 
brought back to Japan practical devices immediately applicable to traditional 
handicraft manufactures. The latter matriculated at British or German universities, 
generally earning high marks, and replaced foreign advisers after their return to 
Japan. We cannot say that they were more skilled than foreigners. However, they 
could at least give their guidance in Japanese and display more understanding of 
local conditions. 
     Having gone through the most difficult years, the Japanese economy 
entered into a period of sustained economic growth after 1886. Economists regard 
this year as the starting point of Japan's modern economic growth.13 Aspects of 
this sustained growth were truly peculiar among less developed countries of that 
time. We shall examine them in the following section.
3. Technological Aspects of Japan's Modern Economic Growth
The Leading Role of the Traditional Sector 
First the author would like to stress the importance of the traditional sector in 
Japan's modern economic growth. Since the classical work written by Professor 
Ohkawa Kazushi was published this fact has been widely accepted regarding the 
economy as a whole.14 However, as for the manufacturing sector, growth was 
accompanied by a strikingly rapid rise of the modern spinning industry, and 
therefore the idea arose that this time was the true Japanese Industrial Revolution. 
This line of argument attributes economic growth mainly to the modern sector 
and inclines to regard the traditional sector as a mere remnant of the feudal 
economy. Therefore we need to point out that at least at the early stage of 
economic growth the weight of the traditional sector was overwhelming and 
actually played a leading role.
13 In this paper the author often uses "modern" in the same meaning as 'Westernized"
, but here    "
modern economic growth" is used purely as an economic term. 
14 Ohkawa Kazushi Differential Structure and Agriculture: Essays on Dualistic Growth (Tokyo 1972).
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     Though reliable data were hardly available for the early years, Professor 
Nakamura Takafusa estimates that the traditional sector's share in output of 
manufactures was over 95% around the start of the growth period, gradually 
decreasing with time, reaching about 40% by World War 1.15 Professor Sydney 
Crawcour roughly estimates that it was "nearly three-quarters in the 1880's", then 
fell to "about one-half around the Russo Japanese War" and "about one-third by 
World War I.... This estimate of the importance of traditional industry as a 
producer of manufactures is probably conservative" he adds.16 At any rate, these 
researchers agree that traditional factors played a leading role in the early stage of 
modern economic growth. 
     The development of traditional manufacturing industries already started 
with the opening of the ports. Not only the silk reeling industry, but ceramics, 
lacquer ware, and other handicrafts manufacturing began more or less export-
oriented changes. After the abolishment of the feudal system the development of 
the textile industry started. Perhaps the abolition of many feudal restrictions on 
jobs as well as people's dress had triggered weavers' latent energy on the supply 
side and people's desires for clothing on the demand side. Technologically, 
imported cotton yarn stimulated development. As previously described above, 
weavers had experience using imported cotton yarn soon after the opening of the 
ports and found that cotton yarn spun mechanically on the spinning frame had 
quite different characteristics from local hand spun yarn. Weavers applied those 
characteristics of imported cotton yarn both to create various types of new textiles 
and at the same time to improve productivity of the weaving processes. Rapidly 
increasing imports of cotton yarn after the Restoration inter alia testified to the 
development of the traditional textile industry depending on imported cotton 
yarn.17 Though this industry was oriented towards the domestic market, 
Matsukata's export promotion policy added many new items to export-oriented 
traditional manufacturing, for instance, the processing of sea foods, knitting mats, 
braiding cords, etc. 
     Transferred Western technology played an important role in this rise of 
traditional industries. This process is often explained by saying that the Japanese 
modified imported technology to adapt it to Japanese local conditions and 
succeeded in incorporating it into the local economy. However, this explanation
15 
16 
17
Nakamura Takafusa Nippon Keizai [The Japanese Economy] (Tokyo 1980) 86. 
 Duus, Peter, ed. The Cambridge History of Japan 6 (Cambridge 1988) 416. 
As for the relation between imported cotton yarn and the development of the textile industry, 
see Nakaoka Tetsuro Op. cit., and 'The Role of Domestic Technical Innovation in Foreign 
Technology Transfer: The Case of the Japanese Cotton Textile Industry', Osaka City University 
Economic Review 18 (1982) 45-62; Nakamura Satoru Meiji Ishin no KisokSz6 [The Infra-structure 
of the Meiji Restoration] (Tokyo 1968) Ch. 5.
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seems to be too simplistic and impersonal to cover the whole process. The actual 
process was a more dynamic social transformation in which the traditional 
industries reacted to exogenous factors and developed themselves through 
numerous failures and successes. For instance, as we have seen above, not only 
Western imported cotton yarn (embodying Western technology) but also the 
abolition of feudalism played a crucial role in the development of the traditional 
textile industry. While imported yarn enabled creation of new textiles, imported 
dye stuff was often used by local dyers without any chemical knowledge causing 
innumerable troubles, resulting in serious damage to local textile industries. 
However, this damage gave the Japanese a strong stimulus to learn chemical 
science. In the growth process of this industry, from 1886, Japanese chemists, who 
had returned from the West, played an important role. Such dynamic interaction 
of exogenous and endogenous factors was a common but remarkable aspect of the 
development of all traditional manufacturing industries. 
     Perhaps a far more remarkable aspect of the development was a change 
occurring in the mode of production. Most manufacturing was based on small 
scale household industry. Silk reeling, cotton spinning, cotton weaving, braiding 
cords, etc., were relying on peasant sidelines, while silk weaving, lacquer ware, 
ceramics, etc., were jobs of urban craftsmen. The production process was generally 
organized by wholesale dealers employing more or less a 'putting out' system. 
Along with the development of the each industry a certain type of factory 
production system appeared, and through a period of competition with the 
traditional production mode, eventually established its existence in the industry 
around World War I. Here we adopt the example of the silk reeling industry, 
which has been most intensively investigated, and briefly look at the process of its 
industrial transformation.
The Case of the Silk Reeling Industry 
    Table 1 shows the remarkable growth of this industry during the early 
stage of Japan's modern economic growth. This development started with the 
opening of ports, relying on traditional technology and production mode. 
Japanese silk yarn however was unable to acquire a good reputation in the 
international market, due partly to a difference in quality due to technology 
differences, and partly because of a lack cottage industry product homogeneity.
26
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Table 1: Production and Export of Silk Yarn
1889-93 (annual average) 
1899-03 (annual average) 
1909-13 (annual average)
Production Export 
    457 365 
    1,110 662 
    1,924 1,110 
    3,375 2,563 
          unit: thousand kwan
Source: Allen, G. C. A Short Economic History of Modern Japan (London 1981) 69.
Faced with a stagnation of silk exports after the Restoration, the government 
decided to introduce Western silk reeling technology together with the factory 
production system as an easy way to upgrade the quality of local silk yarn to an 
internationally competitive level. It employed Paul Brunat, a French specialist, as 
a technical advisor and established a model silk reeling mill with French 
technology at Tomioka in 1870. Around this time more three model mills, based 
on Italian technology, were established by Maebashi Han in Maebashi, Tokyo's 
Ono-gumi and KBbush6. As is known well, these model mills did not diffuse into 
the local industry in their original form.18 
     The reason for this is clear. There was a deep gap between the economic 
operation of those mills and local manufacturers' capabilities, who relied largely 
on peasant manual labor. The required capital gap was especially enormous. 
Maebashi Mill was the smallest of the above four. The equipment for this mill was 
manufactured by local carpenters using wooden construction under the guidance 
of a foreign advisor. Even a mill of this size was far beyond the reach of rural 
reelers and appropriate only to the financial capability of a former han. 
     However, many local silk reelers visited those mills, observed the operation 
of Western reeling equipment and found that many reels working in a single 
working unit was rather similar to a Japanese traditional reeling apparatus called 
Zaguri-ki. Efforts to copy it immediately started. The reeling unit was basically 
traditional but some superior devices of Western origin were also adopted. The 
multi-axle driving mechanism was simplified using wooden construction, as far as 
possible, and constructed by local carpenters. The equipment was driven
18 In this section the following works were referred to: Okumura Shoji Koban Kiito Watetsu [Gold 
  Coins, Silk Yarn and Old Japanese Iron] (Tokyo 1973); Ueyama Kazuo 'Silk Reeling 
  Technology and the Formation of Kikaiguri', in Unno Fukuju, ed. Gijutsu no Shakaishi [A Social 
  History of Technology] 3 (Tokyo 1982) 168-205; Suzuki Jun 'The Development of Boilers for 
   Kikaiguri', Shigaku-Zasshi 101. 7 (1992) 33-61; Minami, R. & Makino, F. 'Technology Choices in 
   the Silk Reeling Industry', in Minami, R. & Kiyokawa, Y., eds. Nippon no K6gy6ka to Gijutsu 
  Hatten [Japan's Industrialization and Technological Progress] (Tokyo 1987) 41-63.
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sometimes by human power and sometimes by water power. Cocoon processing 
equipment also was copied by local copper processing craftsmen simplifying it as 
far as possible. The earliest version of Japanized silk reeling equipment, whose 
rough design was borrowed from that of Tomioka Mill, appeared as early as in 
1874. 
     The new reeling technology based on japanized equipment was called 
Kikaiguri (mechanical reeling) as compared to traditional technology called Zaguri. 
Kikaiguri was hybrid in its nature in the sense that it retained appropriate parts of 
traditional technology and at the same time incorporated advanced elements of 
Western technology. The most impressive point of this technology was its 
exemplary capital saving nature. Kikaiguri equipment with 100 basins came at a 
total cost of 1,900 yen, while Tomioka's equipment, with 300 basins, cost 37,000 
yen.19 Nevertheless it was still capital intensive compared to Zaguri technology. 
Even such cheap equipment was considered by average reelers to be too 
expensive though the selling price of Kikaiguri yarn in the export market was 
considerably higher than that of Zaguri yarn. Its diffusion therefore was rather 
slow. However, it was a very important change because it was a transitional form 
of the factory system born in the traditional industry. 
     Meanwhile, traditional technology had improved under the impact of the 
West. Brunat introduced know-how for the killing of silk worms, selecting, 
storing and cooking cocoons. Such know-how was directly applicable to 
traditional processes without any modification. There was a technical change in 
the reeling apparatus. In traditional Zaguri-ki weavers had to manually rotate a 
small reel onto which filaments from several cocoons were reeled, after having 
been combined together into a single thread. In the 1870's a pedal reeling 
apparatus was invented in which the small reel was driven by a foot pedal. This 
enabled workers to use their two hands exclusively for taking care of filaments 
and, as a result, improved the quality of silk yarn. Though productivity of this 
apparatus was lower than that of Kikaiguri equipment, peasants often organized 
village workshops and tried to raise productivity by the division of manual labor. 
Village workshops were effective for product homogenization. Some villages also 
bought pedal reeling apparatuses collectively and distributed them to peasants 
individually. 
     Advantages of Zaguri technology were often related to the rural socio-
economic structure. Village (or community) workshops were an example. In most 
regions peasants combined crop cultivation, sericulture and silk reeling. This 
resulted in cheap wages and low cocoon costs, which constituted the basis of
19 Ueyama Kazuo Op. cit., (1982)183.
28
European Industrial Economy and Asia
Zaguri competitiveness. Meetings designed to improve the quality of cocoons and 
silkworm eggs were also organized, sometimes at a community level and 
sometimes at a regional level. These developed into a large rural movement for 
technical learning and for diffusion of knowledge. Sustained by these efforts 
rooted in rural communities, Zaguri was overwhelming at the early stage. 
     However, along with the diffusion of modern engineering, Kikaiguri 
technology also gradually improved. For instance, at the early stage reelers used a 
cast iron boiler made by local craftsmen which was nothing but a large iron kettle. 
Soon, the transfer of modern mechanical engineering from Tokyo and Yokohama 
enabled local craftsmen to manufacture a simplified type of Cornish boiler. By 
1886 a local craftsman in Nagano prefecture invented a new boiler which was 
actually a compound Cornish and Multitubular boiler. Adoption of this boiler 
improved heat control of processes and at the same time decreased fuel 
consumption dramatically 20 Kikaiguri entrepreneurs also made every effort to 
develop an efficient work system, sometimes borrowing even from the Zaguri 
system. 
     Thus Kikaiguri and Zaguri developed concurrently in the 1880's. At the 
end of this decade, the share of Kikaiguri in the total output of the silk reeling 
industry was one third, with Zaguri still holding the larger share. Professor 
Minami Ryoshin has studied in detail the competition between the two 
technologies in that decade. Kikaiguri technology was superior with regard to 
labor productivity, selling prices of yarn and basic unit of cocoons. Zaguri 
technology was advantageous in wage rate, purchase prices of cocoons and low 
capital intensity. As a result the rate of return was almost the same for both 
technologies. However, hybrid Kikaiguri technology made its own technical 
progress. Towards the turn of the century performance of locally manufactured 
silk reeling equipment improved rapidly.21 
     In 1894 output from Kikaiguri factory production surpassed 50% for the 
first time. And in the first decade of this century, a rapid shift to Kikaiguri took 
place in most Zaguri silk reeling regions.
The Points at Issue 
     The development cited above may remind the reader of the theory of 
"Proto-industrialization". Firstly, it was development caused from production 
activities for the non regional market (i.e., export-oriented); secondly, these 
production activities were rural manufactures relying on peasants' part time and
20 Suzuki Jun Op. cit., (1992) 47-8. 
21 Minami, R. & Makino, F. Op. cit., (1987).
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activities; and thirdly, along with development, modes of production shifted from 
household production, under the putting out system to mechanized factory 
production. Though some small differences exist, this development is strongly 
reminiscent of the proto-industrialization process which occurred in Flanders 22 
     This type of development was not restricted to the silk reeling industry. 
Many regional cotton textile industries followed a similar course. For instance 
there was a well developed cotton textile industry in south Osaka which 
depended on peasants' cottage industry and the putting out system before the 
Restoration. After the abolition of the feudal system it began to develop rapidly. 
It was not export-oriented but oriented to the domestic market outside the region. 
Along with the development a 'manu-factory' system based on local treadle looms 
began to emerge. And finally the advent of locally invented power looms 
accelerated a shift from the putting out system to the factory system in the 
decades between 1910 and 193023 
     This development conforms to Marxist theory, which claims that the mode 
of production develops first from the putting out system, through the manu-
factory to the 'machino-factory' system. As Japanese historians have been mostly 
influenced by the Marxist economic theory, they regarded these facts simply as a 
sign that the Japanese economy as well as the European developed equally under 
the same laws of world history, never feeling uncomfortable about the similarity 
between Japanese and European development. However, for those of us who 
tend to see Japanese development from a developing country comparative point 
of view, this similarity is very peculiar. 
     Latin American countries also developed export-oriented economies when 
they came into contact with the European industrial economy. Professor Furtade 
classifies them into three types: "(a) economies exporting temperate agricultural 
commodities; (b) economies exporting tropical agricultural commodities; (c) 
economies exporting mineral products". Exported commodities were all primary 
goods not manufactures. Argentina and Uruguay represent type (a) where large
22 Professor Saito Osamu summarizes characteristics of the process of proto-industrialization into 
   the following three: i) production activity oriented not to inside the region but to the market 
   outside the region; ii) production activities conducted as rural household manufacturing, 
   which were often organized by urban dealers with the 'putting out system', and consequently 
   characterized the transition to the second stage by a shift to the factory system; iii) commercial 
   agriculture co-existed in the same regional economy, and usually this developed into the 
   regional division of labour between rural industrial and large scale crop agricultural areas. In 
   the Japanese case this third aspect seems to have been unclear. Saito Osamu 'The Theory of 
   Proto-industrialization: Its Results and Prospects', in Yasuba, Y. & Saito, 0., eds. Puroto 
  K6gy6ka-ki no Keizai to Shakai [The Economy and Society in the Period of Proto-
  industrialization] (Tokyo 1983) 13-35. 
23 Kajinishi Mitsuhaya Nippon Kindai Mengy6 no Seiritsu [The Rise of the Modern Cotton Industry 
  in Japan] (Tokyo 1950).
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scale agriculture like that of the United States developed. Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Central America, etc., represent type (b) where "tropical products 
tended to remain in the framework of the traditional economies". Mexico, Chile, 
Peru, Bolivia, etc., represent type (c) where "small-scale mining operations of the 
artisan or quasi-artisan type were gradually replaced by large-scale production 
controlled by foreign capital and administered from abroad 24 Nowhere did the 
Japanese type proto-industrialization process take place. This also holds true for 
other countries in Asia. Among less developed countries at that time, therefore, 
the Japanese type of development was exceptional indeed. 
     In the introduction of this paper, the author set forth the question, why did 
contact with the frontier of the European industrial economy only lead Japan to a 
course of industrialization and modernization while leading almost all of the other 
less developed countries to the 'development of underdevelopment'? The fact that 
only Japan went through the process of proto-industrialization provides the 
answer to this question. However, this answer is nothing but a transformation of 
the above question to another question. Why was Japan the only country to go 
through a process of proto-industrialization when meeting the frontier of the 
European industrial economy? 
     This question can be divided into a series of small questions. Was Japan 
already prepared for industrialization in the Edo period? Did the rice economy 
have a bearing on this development? Was it accidental or necessary that the 
contemporary European economy demanded Japanese manufactured goods 
which were just then appearing? Did the geographical position of Japan have a 
bearing on this development? What role did technology transfer play in this 
development? And so on. 
     The author has no desire to answer these questions in this paper. A long 
series of investigations will be needed to give exact replies to each question. 
Anticipating that the discussions at this conference will bring abundant insight for 
such investigation, the author only tries to introduce in the following section the 
opinions of three Japanese scholars which are keenly relevant to these questions.
4. Global Technology Transfer and Asian Development
Global Technology Transfer 
     Professor Kawakatsu Heita calls to our attention the coincidental nature of 
the product mix between the European industrial economy and the Japanese 
traditional economy. The European industrial economy demanded silk yarn and
24 Furtade, Celso Economic Development of Latin America (Cambridge 1978) 47-49.
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tea from Japan and wanted to sell cotton and wool textiles, and refined sugar to 
Japan. Manufacturing industries producing all these products already existed in 
Japan (with the one exception of wool), and they reacted vigorously to this 
demand and supply. Was it a coincidence? He insists that it was not 25 
     It was from India that cotton textiles were introduced into Britain, largely in 
the late seventeenth century. The struggle between Britain and Holland for 
Indonesian spices was settled with the triumph of Holland. Up until that time, 
British merchants in India had been using Indian cotton textiles to pay for 
Indonesian spices. Being excluded from the spice trade they decided to export 
cotton textiles directly to Britain. The increasing stream of Indian cotton from the 
late seventeenth century adversely affected the local British textile industry, 
resulting in various contermeasures, and eventually stimulating the rise of the 
British cotton industry, which in turn triggered the emergence of the European 
industrial economy. Thus cotton textiles as well as the cotton industry were 
transferred from Asia to Europe through the historical interchange between East 
and West beginning with Vasco da Gama 26 
     This pattern more or less holds for three other products: silk, tea, and sugar. 
They were originally Asian products. Though the process of introduction was 
different for each product, during the period from the late seventeenth to the 
eighteenth century they diffused widely in Western society and eventually were 
incorporated into the product mix of the European industrial economy. 
Kawakatsu emphasizes that these products were introduced into Japan before the 
closure of the country and that self-sufficient production was established during 
this latter period. That is, they were incorporated into the product mix of the 
Japanese traditional economy at nearly in the same time as they were in the 
European industrial economy. 
     In short, he insists that what happened in Japan after the opening of the 
ports was an encounter of two economies: one strongly influenced by the transfer 
of products and technology from Asia to the West since Vasco da Gama, and the 
other by that from continental Asia to our eastern isolated islands. It was, 
therefore, not an accident but rather a necessary development that just those 
products that the contemporary European economy demanded were being 
manufactured in Japan, and that this demand stimulated the process of proto-
industrialization in rural Japan.
25 Kawakatsu Heita 'Outer Pressures and Intra-Asian Competitions to the Industrialization of 
  Japan', in Hamashita, T. & Kawakatsu, H., eds. Ajia K6ekiken to Nippon K6gy6ka: 1500-1900 [The 
  Asian Trading Zone and Japan's Industrialization] (Tokyo 1991) 158-93. 
26 Kawakatsu Heita 'The Transfer of Cotton to the West,' Waseda Seijikeizaigaku Zasshi 270-2 (1982) 
   100-135.
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     Kawakatsu's proposition is still hypothetical and much future research will 
be required to confirm it. It is, however, at the very least suggestively relevant to 
our present discussion. He suggests that we consider the above issues in the long 
historical interchanges between East and West since Vasco da Gama. This is just 
what concerns us at this conference. Already in the first conference at Amsterdam 
& Leiden contributions of the East-Arabs, India and China-to the emergence of 
early modern science was one of critical issues in relation to Needham's "Grand 
Question".27 The frontier of the European industrial economy brought to Asia 
Western science and technology. To a certain degree, this was the return of 
transformed Asian tradition. At the very least this is the case with technology. 
     In addition, interchanges existed between Asian countries. The flow of 
goods and information from China, for example, had a strong influence on the 
Asian economy in the period of our concern. For instance, Chinese sugar refining 
technology was established in the late sixteenth century. It was transferred to 
other Asian countries from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries and 
contributed much to the development of the sugar industry in each country. 
These processes and their relation to later colonial sugar economies were studied 
by Professor Christian Daniels.28 The frontier of the European industrial economy, 
coming to Asia, interacted with influences coming from Asian countries in this 
way and determined its specific development. 
     The above consideration seems to shed some light on the differences 
between Asian and Latin American development. A large flow of products from 
Latin America to Europe also existed from the time of Columbus. Being mainly 
primary products, however, they were less influential on the product mix of the 
European industrial economy, to say nothing of science and technology. In 
addition, there seems to have been less of an exchange of goods and technology 
between Latin American countries. Perhaps each country was tied too strongly to 
a suzerain country in Europe. These differences might have strongly conditioned 
the later development of Asia and Latin America. Asian development seems to 
have reflected far more strongly the cross-regional transfer of products and 
information inside Asia.
27 Cohen, H. F. 'The Emergence of Early Science in Europe; with Remarks on Needham's "Grand 
   Question," Including the Issues of the Cross-Cultural Transfer of Scientific Ideas', Journal of the 
  Japan-Netherlands Institute 3 (Tokyo 1991) 9-31. 
28 Daniels, Christian 'Inter East Asian Trade and the Transfer of Production Technology in the 
   Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', in Hamashita & Kawakatsu, eds. , Op. cit., 70-101.
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China and Holland in Japan 
     The above discussion can also be applied to Edo Japan. Though being 
relatively isolated from the world, it was not a period of complete isolation but 
one in which a strong cultural exchange with Asia as well as Europe existed. With 
regard to the flow of products, major exchanges existed to and from China, Korea 
and Holland. Along these interchanges of science, technology and culture can be 
perceived. Influences from Asia and Europe interacted with each other to develop 
a peculiar culture in this relative isolation. 
     The late Professor Yoshida Mitsukuni emphasized the fact that in this 
relative isolation Dutch influences were accepted following Japan's long tradition 
of learning from China and Korea.29 Urban design, construction and architecture, 
weaving and dyeing, ceramics, lacquer ware, iron manufacture and other 
metallurgy; Japan acquired all this material culture through the guidance of 
immigrants from Korea and China. As for spiritual culture, Japan accepted also 
many essential things from abroad, for instance, Chinese characters, Buddhism, 
Confucianism, etc. This tradition is reflected in the attitude of the Japanese who 
expected high quality goods and superior culture coming from abroad, being 
eager to learn from foreign books as well as from foreign immigrants, sending 
many students overseas to China for advanced study, and making every effort to 
reproduce these superior products in Japan. 
    This attitude was applied to Dutch goods and books in the Edo period as 
well. "Scientific instruments such as telescopes, microscopes, and celestial globes; 
guns with flintlock, pistols, scarlet woolen cloth, Persian or Indian rugs, glasses, 
drugs, Western dogs and horses; all these things were imported through the 
Dutch trading house."30 High officials of the Bakufu as well as the Daimyo 
competed keenly to obtain these things. "Ranpeki" (Dutch taste) which 
constituted the highest luxury of the upper class of the Edo period, was a 
modified version of the traditional worship of Chinese goods. And the Japanese 
eagerly studied Dutch books in order to discover the background of this amazing 
material culture. Unfortunately no guidance of Western immigrants was available 
because of the isolation policy. Therefore they developed the method of studying 
imported models with reference to the descriptions of translated Dutch books, 
then reconstructing these models. 
     Yoshida's proposal is important for understanding the role of Rangaku in 
the development of Japan. In the second section of this paper, we have described
29 Yoshida Mitsukuni Nippon to Chilgoku -Gijutsu to Kindaika (Japan and China: Technology and 
  Modernization] (Tokyo 1989). 
30 Ibid., 21.
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the samurai's behavior in acquiring Western style armament as "at first to acquire 
a textbook through the Dutch trading house in Nagasaki; then to carry out a 
collaborated translation of it into Japanese; and finally to construct the object, 
through trial and error, according to the description found in the book". This was 
the attitude long nurtured by Rangaku students during the Edo period but at the 
same time it was deeply rooted in the Japanese tradition of learning from Korea 
and China. This was the reason why Rangaku, which was the province of a small 
group throughout the whole Edo period, could play such an important role in 
Japan's later development. Once national attention was oriented towards the 
West, people accepted naturally the Rangaku method as appropriate for learning 
from the West. Searching for superior things, whether spiritual or material, in the 
West, importing books on them from the West, translating them into Japanese, 
studying them collectively, importing models, studying them with reference to 
descriptions found in the literature, and finally reproducing them in Japan: this 
was the intellectual attitude of the Japanese underlying the whole process of 
Japan's modernization (Westernization). We can perceive a strong heritage from 
Rangaku in this attitude. 
     Though this attitude seems to have been not so adapted to creative works 
in science as compared to the European intellectual tradition, it was less 
discriminative against mechanical arts. Some Daimyo carried out mechanical arts 
by themselves. Shimazu Nariakira invented a spinning frame. His princess wove 
cotton textiles by herself and presented them to important visitors. Yamao Yozo, a 
samurai from the ChOshu Han and later Minister of Kobusha, did not hesitate to 
work as an apprentice at a shipyard in Glasgow for the study of shipbuilding. 
Yamanobe Takeo, another samurai from the Tsuwano Han and later president of 
the Osaka Spinning Company, worked as an apprentice at a spinning mill in 
Manchester, and transferred skills to his company. Such behavior is amazing 
when we consider the fact that Tokugawa feudalism was under the strict 
discrimination of social classes which placed craftsmen at the second from the 
lowest. Perhaps this can be explained by the Rangaku tradition. Shimazu 
Nariakira was famous for his Ranpeki (Dutch taste). His taste for mechanical arts 
was inseparable from the elegant taste of the upper class. Dutch learning was also 
inseparable from it. In this tradition, pursuit of intellectual interests was always 
connected with reproduction of curious mechanical products from the West. This 
tradition was advantageous to Japan's industrialization.
Trade between Asian Countries
    We have been stressing the importance of seeing Japan's development in 
the history of intercourse between the East and West and also between Asian
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countries. Economically this means that we should pay more attention to intra-
Asian trade. Dr. Sugihara Kaoru demonstrated that trade between Asian 
countries grew at a rate of 5.4% per annum from 1883 to 1913 while that between 
Europe and Asia grew at 3.2%.31 His analysis shows that the main constituents of 
infra-Asian trades were, cotton yarn, raw cotton and rice. Roughly speaking this 
growth was caused by the following: first, the modern (Western style) spinning 
industry emerged in India in the mid nineteenth century; second, a flow of cotton 
yarn from India to Japan stimulated the rise of the modern cotton spinning 
industry in Japan; third, the flow of cotton yarn from India and Japan to East 
Asian countries caused the development of local cotton textile industries; and 
along with these changes, certain Asian regions were specializing in staple 
agriculture or cotton cultivation and consequently the trade of rice and raw cotton 
increased. 
     Sugihara's findings teach us that it was not only the European industrial 
economy but the emerging Asian industrial economy which affected the later 
development of Japan. Asian countries began to influence each other through 
intra-Asian trade. Asian influences made a dynamic impact on Japan's 
development which in turn affected Asian development. We can confirm this by 
Japan's machinery trade to Asia which embodies nothing else but a transfer of 
technology. 
     In the third section, we referred to the traditional/Western hybrid nature of 
Kikaiguri equipment which made this machine appropriate for local conditions. 
Most machines invented by the Japanese in the Meiji period were of a similar 
nature. Some among them became important Japanese machinery exports to Asia. 
Perhaps what was appropriate for Japan was also appropriate for the rest Asia. 
For example, rickshaws occupied the top rank of early machinery exports. Their 
main destinations were Hong Kong, Singapore, Penang and Indian cities, towns 
which had developed through intra-Asian trade demonstrating perhaps a 
similarity in urban transportation conditions between them and Tokyo, Yokohama 
and Osaka.32 The invention of a noodle manufacturing machine is another 
example. From the turn of the century this machine was also actively exported to 
China and Korea, where noodles are much loved.33 These exports, however, did 
not continue for long. With the advent of street cars in Singapore and other cities, 
the export of rickshaws declined rapidly. The Chinese soon began to manufacture
31 Sugihara Kaoru 'The Growth of Intra-Asian Trade and its Structure', Shakai-Keizaishi-gaku 51.1   (
1985) 17-53. 
32 Saito Toshihiko Jinrikisha [Rickshaws] (Tokyo 1979) 219-20. 
33 Furusawa Kiyoko 'The Role of a Failed Rural Machinery Manufacturer', in Nakaoka Tetsuro, 
  ed. Gijutsu Keisei no Kokusai Hikaku [International Comparisons of Technological Capability 
 Building] (Tokyo 1990) 230-267.
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copied noodle-making machines. What was appropriate technology for Japanese 
mechanics was also appropriate for Chinese ones. Since they could easily copy 
the machine, its export declined rapidly. These declines motivated the infant 
Japanese machinery industry to develop other products and cultivate different 
fields. Many manufacturers tried to adapt. Some failed and disappeared, while 
others were successful in shifting, for instance, to machine tools or electrical 
machinery. 
    The above process suggests that hybrid technology or Japanized Western 
technology may have been more appropriate to other East Asian countries than 
original Western technology and that the transfer of such technology might have 
helped endogenous Asian development which in turn affected Japanese 
development. We can find many examples suggesting this, especially in the Asian 
textile industry of this period. Unfortunately, Japan's invasion of East Asia, 
beginning in the 1920's, stopped the full exploitation of possibilities for the 
mutually interactive development of East Asian countries.
Concluding Remarks 
     The author has been focusing on technological aspects of Japan's 
development in this paper. This is because he is a Japanese specializing in the 
study of modern technology transfer. His intention was to depict, through a 
history of Japanese development, the main aspects of a period in which both 
European and intra-Asian contact interacted dynamically, causing varied 
endogenous evolution or involution. Roughly speaking, we can say that it was a 
period in which the dynamic action of the European industrial nucleus proceeded 
to the East, operating on the traditional economies of Asian countries, integrating 
them into the European economy, and finally establishing colonial economies 
there. However, a closer look will reveal the more dynamic interaction of 
endogenous factors and exogenous impacts. Japan is a good example. Exogenous 
influence came not only from Europe, but also from China, India and Korea. 
European influence included some elements of Asian tradition earlier transferred 
to the West. Japanese endogenous factors also involved elements of Indian, 
Chinese, Korean, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch traditions. The dynamic 
interaction between them all is reflected in Japan's development since the initial 
contact with the frontier of the European industrial economy. If we shift our view 
point to other Asian countries we find other types of dynamic interaction between 
endogenous and exogenous factors, resulting in each country's specific 
development. 
     Scientific and technology transfer was not a phenomenon isolated from 
such dynamic interaction. As we have seen in this paper, they were invariably
37
Nakaoka T.
transferred along with the flow of products, immigrants, or political influence, etc. 
In other words, the study of the transfer of science and technology between 
Europe and Asia, and also between Asian countries in this period, will disentangle 
the dynamic interaction of numerous factors. 
     The author expects that discussions in this conference will offer many leads 
to the understanding of Asian development today, while at the same time offering 
solutions to Needham's "Grand Question" of why modern science emerged only 
in Western Europe.
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